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Abstract 
This paper examines the EU counterterrorism policy responses to the attacks in Paris, 7-9 January 2015. It provides an 
overview of the main EU-level initiatives that have been put forward in the weeks following the events and that will 
be discussed in the informal European Council meeting of 12 February 2015. The paper argues that a majority of these 
proposals predated the Paris shootings and had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy 
and lawfulness. A case in point is the EU Passenger Name Record (PNR) proposal. The paper finds that EU 
counterterrorism policy responses to the Paris events raise two fundamental challenges:  
 A first challenge is to the freedom of movement, Schengen and Union citizenship. The priority given to the 
expansion in the use of large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring of all travellers including EU 
citizens stands in contravention of Schengen and the free movement principle.  
 A second challenge concerns EU democratic rule of law. Current pressures calling for an urgent adoption of 
measures like the EU PNR challenge the scrutiny roles held by the European Parliament and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union on counterterrorism measures in a post-Lisbon Treaty setting. 
The paper proposes that the EU adopts a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty based on an EU security 
(criminal justice-led) cooperation model firmly anchored in current EU legal principles and rule of law standards. This 
model would call for ‘less is more’ concerning the use, processing and retention of data by police and intelligence 
communities, and it would instead pursue better and more accurate use of data that would meet the quality standards 
of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings. 
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Introduction  
The killings of 7-9 January 2015 in Paris have spurred overwhelming responses of solidarity with the journal 
Charlie Hebdo1 and widespread reactions condemning the events.2 The deaths of 17 people led to a wide 
number of demonstrations by millions of people across France and Europe to honour the victims. During the 
following weeks questions were raised about the motives of the perpetrators, their degree of association with 
jihadist groups in Europe and the Middle East,3 and their relationship with previous attacks. Debates have 
followed about freedom of expression, Islamophobia, but also radicalisation and counterterrorism policies for 
national4 and European authorities to deploy in order to best respond to these and future terrorist attacks.  
This paper examines the European Union’s policy responses to the Paris shootings. A number of statements 
and policy agendas have proliferated since the events, starting with a Joint Statement signed in Paris on 11 
January by Ministers of Interior and Justice of the member states. This was followed by an input from the EU 
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) in preparation for the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs 
Ministers in Riga on 29 January, where member states’ ministries formally adopted the so-called ‘Riga Joint 
Statement’, which outlines a set of counterterrorism policy priorities. The European Commission has also 
presented its ideas aimed at addressing the challenges posed by the Paris killings. These will be issues at the 
heart of the discussions in the forthcoming European Council meeting of 12 February.5  
This paper argues that a majority of the proposals outlined in these responses predated the Paris shootings 
and some had until that point proved contentious as regards their efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. 
Building on the political momentum generated by the context of unanimity and solidarity in response to the 
Paris killings, proposals that until now had found narrow support are now presented as urgent and ‘must-take’ 
steps to prevent ‘another Paris’.  
A key example is the push currently given to accelerate the adoption of the European Passenger Name Record 
(PNR). EU PNR would establish a new database tracking the movement of and allowing for the blanket 
collection of data on all EU citizens and residents travelling by air within the Union, in addition to the bulk 
 
 Didier Bigo is Director of the Centre d’Etudes sur les Conflits, Liberté et Sécurité (CCLS) and Professor at Sciences-Po Paris 
and King’s College London. Evelien Brouwer is Associate Professor at VU University Amsterdam (The Netherlands). Sergio 
Carrera is Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Justice and Home Affairs Section at the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS). Elspeth Guild is Associate Senior Research Fellow in the same section at CEPS and Jean Monnet Professor ad 
personam at Queen Mary, University of London, as well as at the Radboud University Nijmegen (The Netherlands). Emmanuel-
Pierre Guittet is Lecturer at the University of Manchester (UK). Julien Jeandesboz is an Assistant Professor at the University of 
Amsterdam. Francesco Ragazzi is Lecturer at the University of Leiden (The Netherlands). Amandine Scherrer is European 
Studies Coordinator and Associate Researcher at CCLS. 
1 http://charliehebdo.fr. 
2 For a detailed account of the Paris events, refer to http://mondediplo.com/2015/02/04radicalisation. 
3 www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/11/paris-attacks-worldwide-inquiry-jihadi-networks-charlie-hebdo. 
4 Refer to www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/21/france-anti-terror-measures-paris-attacks-manuel-valls. 
5 “EU Leaders to Discuss Terrorism at February Summit”, European Voice, 9 January 2015.  
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collection of data on international travellers. Other ideas include revisiting Schengen to permit a broader 
consultation or systematic checks of EU nationals’ movements by police and intelligence services through the 
Schengen Information System (SIS II),6 another EU database regarding persons to be refused entry or subject 
to specific checks at borders. 
Accordingly, this paper finds that EU counterterrorism policy responses to the Paris events present us with 
two fundamental policy challenges: 
First, a challenge to freedom of movement, Schengen and European citizenship. A fundamental 
contradiction arises when putting together all the initiatives outlined in these EU responses. The primary focus 
given to expanding the use of large-scale surveillance and monitoring of EU citizens’ freedom of circulation 
(travel) and information by law enforcement authorities stands in contravention of Schengen rules and the 
principle of free movement inside the Schengen area, including for EU citizens. EU freedom of movement 
rules prohibit systematic checks and surveillance of EU citizens on the move, which is precisely what 
instruments such as the EU PNR or the newly proposed amendments of SIS II are seeking to establish. 
Second, a challenge to EU democratic rule of law. Current calls for an urgent adoption of contentious 
measures like the EU PNR system constitute an additional challenge to the role of and position held by the 
European Parliament Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) on these and related EU security measures. On the basis of the 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty, the European Parliament and the CJEU gained legal competence to ensure democratic accountability 
and judicial scrutiny of EU counterterrorism policies. They have both expressed concerns about the necessity, 
proportionality and fundamental rights compliance of large-scale (blanket) surveillance and data retention 
instruments, which is inherent to the EU counterterrorism responses to the Paris events. 
In light of these two challenges, the EU counterterrorism proposals discussed so far are aimed at steering the 
adoption of previously existing instruments and amending existing ones in ways whose lawfulness and 
necessity to address phenomena such as those witnessed in France remain unsettled.  
What should the EU do? A new European Agenda on Security and Liberty could instead be adopted by 
paying due regard to the lessons learned from previous EU policy experiences on counterterrorism, where 
rapid and emergence-led policy responses have in the past taken precedence over quality and democratically 
(rule of law) accountable decision-making. European institutions and actors should exercise caution and be 
wary of adopting without due care and democratic debate controversial EU antiterrorism instruments and tools 
whose impact may weaken the very founding principles that the Union conveys and stands for.  
Reflection should be given to the kind of EU responses and contribution to addressing the Paris events that 
would ensure a European added value and therefore justify ‘more Europe’ in these domains. Priority 
could be given to a more effective and accountable practical use of existing tools and the development of an 
alternative EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model.  
This model would be firmly anchored in existing EU legal and rule of law standards. As a first step the model 
should be based on an in-depth evaluation of the gaps in and deficits of current EU counterterrorism 
legislation, information systems and actors/agencies, as well as the rule of law and implementation 
challenges affecting their practical application. On the basis of this stock-taking and gap analysis, such a model 
should prioritise more effective use of current EU mechanisms and not necessarily seek to adopt new ones 
without proper discussion and independent assessment.  
This new European agenda should aim at pursuing a response where less is more in what concerns the use 
and exchange of data by police and intelligence communities. A guiding principle should be to have less 
data retention and processing, and better and more accurate use of data that meets the quality standards 
of evidence in criminal judicial proceedings. As the Paris events have demonstrated, the main issue was not 
‘finding the needle in the haystack’ or lacking data surveillance, as all the perpetrators of the attacks were 
already known and monitored by French intelligence services.  
 
6 For more information on the SIS II, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/schengen-information-system/index_en.htm. 
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There is instead a crucial need for rule of law-compliant law enforcement activities, rather than more 
technological solutions involving the collection of massive amounts of personal data and metadata. A new 
European Security and Liberty Agenda should foster a way forward in security cooperation in the EU that is 
compliant with democratic rule of law on fundamental rights, where any transnational cooperation on 
national security goes hand-in-hand with independent judicial accountability of intelligence 
communities and law enforcement practices, and proper democratic scrutiny. 
This paper begins by providing an overview of the various EU policy responses that have been advanced so 
far following the Paris events by European institutions and actors and EU member state representatives 
(Section 1). It then discusses the controversies that these kinds of proposals had encountered before the killings 
in France, in particular the lack of support by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (Section 2). Section 3 then explains the two main challenges that the EU responses pose to EU free 
movement principles and Schengen, as well as to democratic rule of law over EU decision-making in police 
and criminal justice cooperation. The paper concludes by putting forward a number of recommendations to 
EU policy-makers and security professionals. 
1. EU policy responses 
The weeks following the Paris events have witnessed the emergence of successive official responses in national 
and European arenas on counterterrorism policies. What have been the main ideas and counterterrorism 
proposals advanced by EU member states and European institutions and actors?  
This section provides a brief overview of the scope and the specific initiatives contained in the responses 
adopted by the Ministries of Interior and Justice of the EU member states (section 1.1), the EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator (section 1.2) as well as the output of the informal Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
meeting in Riga (Latvia) on 29 January (the ‘Riga Joint Statement) and those presented by the European 
Commission (sections 1.3 and 1.4). 
1.1 The Joint Statement of 11 January  
Right after the Paris events, a Joint Statement was published in Paris on 11 January by the Ministries of Interior 
and Justice of Latvia, Germany,7 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the United 
Kingdom8 and Sweden.9 It was adopted in the presence of European Commissioner for Migration and Home 
Affairs Dimitris Avramopoulos, United States Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Deputy 
Secretary of Homeland Security Alejandro Mayorkas, Minister of Public Safety of Canada Steven Blaney, and 
European Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) Gilles de Kerchove.  
The Joint Statement reaffirmed a commitment to fight terrorism10 and called for strengthening cooperation 
amongst the participating member states’ services and those of relevant partners (US and Canada), as well as 
enhancing cooperation of law enforcement in order to “prevent and detect radicalisation in an early stage”. 
The following policy measures were underlined:  
1. to adopt a European Passenger Name Record (PNR) framework, including intra-EU PNR;11 
 
7 www.spiegel.de/international/germany/germany-plans-no-new-terror-laws-in-wake-of-charlie-hebdo-attack-a-
1012188.html. 
8 www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/11/david-cameron-snoopers-charter-tory-election-win. 
9 www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jan/france-joint-statement-of-ministers-for-interrior.pdf. 
10 The Joint Statement recalls that “We are determined to implement all measures that may be helpful with respect to the 
sharing of intelligence information on the different forms of the threat, notably foreign terrorist fighters, on knowledge 
of their movements, and the support they receive, wherever they are, with a view to improving the effectiveness of our 
fight against these phenomena. To that end, we want to underscore our determination to use fully the resources of Europol 
and Eurojust as well as Interpol” (emphasis added). 
11 Proposal for a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime COM(2011) 32 final, Brussels, 2.2.2011. According to the Proposal 
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2. to amend the rules laid down in the Schengen Borders Code to allow for broader consultation of the 
Schengen Information System (SIS II) during the crossing of external borders by individuals enjoying 
the right to free movement; 
3. to reduce the supply of illegal firearms throughout Europe as a priority in the European 
Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT);12 
4. to establish “the detection and screening of travel movements by European nationals crossing the 
European Union’s external borders”, the focus being on more extensive detection and monitoring of 
certain passengers; 
5. to develop the partnership of the major Internet providers allowing for a swift reporting of material 
that aims to incite hatred and terror and the condition of its removing; and 
6. to support the activities of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN).13 
In addition to these actions, certain member state signatories of the Joint Statement are also looking to 
implement restrictive measures to confiscate the travel and identification documents of their own nationals 
who are ‘suspected jihadists’, which reportedly has the support of the European Commission.14 
1.2 The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator 
A second policy response has been the input by the European Counter-Terrorism Coordinator (CTC) in light 
of the informal meeting of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga (Latvia) on 29 January.15 The CTC 
document lays down rather similar ideas to those previously outlined in the 11 January Joint Statement. The 
CTC advanced the following priority thematic areas and initiatives: 
1. Prevention of radicalisation 
 To develop counter narratives and informal joint policies on social media: engage with Internet 
companies, explore the role of Europol in referring terrorism and extremist content to social media 
platforms, and facilitate a European Commission proposal for a common approach on the legal and 
technical possibilities of removing illegal content and ways to speed up cross-border exchange of 
information about owners of IP addresses. 
 To foster strategic communications and counter-narrative policies: propose RAN explore training civil 
society organisations and, drawing on the experience of the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), 
develop and implement a communication and outreach strategy with regard to fundamental rights and 
values. 
 To address the underlying factors of radicalisation: recommend the European Commission develop a 
package of measures to assist member states to address the underlying factors of radicalisation and 
support initiatives related to education, vocational training, job opportunities and integration.  
 
“PNR data is unverified information provided by passengers, and collected by and held in the carriers’ reservation and 
departure control systems for their own commercial purposes. It contains several different types of information, such as 
travel dates, travel itinerary, ticket information, contact details, the travel agent at which the flight was booked, means of 
payment used, seat number and baggage information.” 
12 www.europol.europa.eu/content/eu-policy-cycle-empact. 
13 The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) was launched by the European Commission in September 2011. The 
RAN brings together practitioners, experts and policy-makers from member states, sectors, organisations and academia 
to discuss and identify ‘good practices’ on radicalisation (see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/index_en.htm). 
14 See https://euobserver.com/justice/127252. 
15 Council of the European Union, General Secretariat, Brussels, EU CTC input for the preparation of the informal meeting 
of Justice and Home Affairs Ministers in Riga on 29 January 2015, 17 January 2015. 
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 To develop de-radicalisation, disengagement and rehabilitation programmes, including in prison and 
as an alternative to prison in the judicial context: the Commission could facilitate the exchange of ‘best 
practices’ and support projects.  
2. Border controls 
 Step up the detection and screening of travel movements by EU citizens crossing the Schengen external 
borders.16 
 Amend the Schengen Borders Code to allow for broader consultation of SIS II “during the crossing of 
external borders by individuals enjoying the right to free movement [and] technical solutions should 
be developed so that there is no impact on passenger waiting times at passport controls”. 
 Develop common criteria to enter ‘foreign fighters’ information into SIS II. 
3. Information sharing 
 Move toward a European Passenger Name Record (PNR) framework, including an EU PNR. 
 Increase the use of Europol and boost the information provided by national counterterrorism 
authorities to the ‘Europol Focal Point Travellers’; create a European Counter-Terrorism Centre at 
Europol focusing on intelligence sharing on foreign fighters and terrorist financing tracking, tackling 
firearms, capabilities to identify online terrorist activity and improved strategic intelligence.  
 Develop a more proactive intelligence-led use in cases of terrorist-related convictions of the European 
Criminal Networks Information System (ECRIS),17 a system whereby member states hold a central 
record of their own nationals’ criminal histories that could be shared with other member states.  
 Present a new legislative proposal on data retention by the European Commission.  
 Fully implement and use to its maximum extent the API Directive.18 
 The Commission should explore rules “obliging internet and telecommunications companies operating 
in the EU to provide under certain conditions access of the relevant national authorities to 
communications (share encryption keys)”.  
 Relaunch the discussion on the feasibility of a European Terrorist Financing Tracking System (TFTS). 
4. Judicial response 
 Step up international judicial cooperation in terrorism cases, in particular in cases of foreign fighters. 
 EU member states should make more optimal use of the possibilities for exchange of information on 
prosecutions and convictions with Eurojust,19 and increase the exchange of information with Eurojust 
in cases of trafficking of firearms and cybercrime. 
 
16 Page 6 of the CTC input. See also the Council Conclusions on Terrorism and Border Security, which stated “that the 
examination of the proposals on the Smart Borders Package (Entry/Exist and Registered Travellers Programme) should 
be continued and that the legal and technical conditions for the access for law enforcement purposes to the Entry/Exist 
System by competent authorities of Member States should be examined by the Commission and the Member States so 
that this access is effective from the beginning”, page 5. Council of the EU, Draft Council Conclusions on Terrorism and 
Border Security, 9906/14, Brussels, 16 May 2014. 
17 Refer to http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/european-e-justice/ecris/index_en.htm. 
18 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_ 
immigration/l14582_en.htm. For an evaluation of this Directive, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/documents/policies/immigration/irregular-immigration/docs/evaluation_of_the_api_directive_en.pdf. 
19 Reference is here made to Council Decision 2005/671/JHA of 20 September 2005 on the exchange of information and 
cooperation concerning terrorist offences. 
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 Coordinate at EU level the legal challenges in the gathering and admissibility of ‘e-evidence’ in 
terrorism cases; member states should make maximal use of Eurojust tools, in particular its 
coordination meetings and coordination centres. 
 Develop rehabilitation programmes in the judicial context. 
 Present a legislative proposal to update the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism to 
implement the UN Security Council Resolution 2178. 
5. Firearms  
 To increase EU member states’ participation in the Operational Action Plan on firearms adopted by 
the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI), and to fully 
implement all existing measures dealing with “fighting illicit firearms trafficking”,20 Europol could 
present a state of play on the use by member states of Europol’s firearms database, while the 
Commission could make proposals to improve information exchange mechanisms and the collection 
and destruction of prohibited weapons, and examine possibilities for harmonisation of rules for the 
demilitarisation of firearms and the trade of firearms via the Internet. 
1.3 The Riga Joint Statement 
The above responses provided by and large the basis for the discussions that were held at the last informal 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) meeting in Riga (Latvia) on 29 January. The informal meeting led to the 
adoption of the so-called ‘Riga Joint Statement’ by member states’ Ministries of Interior and Justice. The 
statement constitutes the input by JHA ministers to the discussion at the Informal Meeting of the Heads of 
State or Government on 12 February 2015.21 
One of the conclusions presented in the Joint Statement was that further work should build upon existing EU 
tools by accelerating and amplifying their implementation, and propose new initiatives to increase their 
effectiveness. The ministers also called for “a European agenda on Security…to address the threats to internal 
security of the EU for the next years”, which will be part of the forthcoming review and update of the EU 
Internal Security Strategy by mid-2015.22  
Similar to the previously mentioned responses, the ministers reaffirmed the need to:  
 create “without further delay” an EU PNR framework;  
 cooperate closely with the private sector and “encourage them” to remove “terrorist and extremism 
content from their platforms”, with Europol contributing to the detection of illegal content;  
 enable further information exchange on mobility by Europol Focal Point Travellers;23  
 
20 Refer to Commission Communication, Firearms and the Internal Security of the European Union COM(2013) 716 final, 
Brussels, 21 October 2013. 
21 See Council of the European Union, Informal Meeting of the Heads of State or Government – Draft Statement of the 
Members of the European Council, Brussels, 5853/15, 2 February 2015. 
22 For more information on the Internal Security Strategy, see http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/internal-security/internal-security-strategy/index_en.htm. For a critical analysis see E. Guild and S. Carrera 
(2011), “Towards an Internal (In)Security Strategy in the EU”, CEPS Liberty and Security Series, Brussels. 
23 The CTC Report also highlights how in 2013 Europol created a new Focal Point, TRAVELLERS, within the Analytical 
Work File, which is presented as a ‘pan-European analytical tool’ aimed at supporting the authorities of participating 
member states and third countries with whom an operational agreement has been concluded for the collection, analysis 
and sharing of information as regards “recruitment and travel facilitation of suspected individuals”. The Focal Point can 
produce “EU travel patterns” and operational reports seeking to support member states’ investigations. See Council of 
the EU, Report on the Implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 28 November 2014, 15799/14, Brussels. 
See also the Discussion Paper http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15715-2014-REV-2/en/pdf. 
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 reinforce exchange of information and develop further cross-border cooperation on fighting illegal 
trafficking of firearms, by systematically inserting information into SIS II; 
 fight against financing of terrorism; 
 amend the Schengen Borders Code in order to “reinforce external borders by making it possible to 
proceed to systematic checks on individuals enjoying the right of free movement against databases 
relevant to the fight against terrorism based on the common risk indicators.” 
1.4 The European Commission  
At the Riga informal JHA meeting, Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris 
Avramopoulos highlighted the priorities for the European Commission in response to the Paris events, some 
of which show a surprising resemblance to those already highlighted by EU member states and the 
CTC.24  
These include continuing support of member states in preventing and addressing radicalisation and other forms 
of extremism through RAN, developing “concrete workable solutions” that will strengthen the commitment of 
social media platforms to reducing illegal content online, and increasing the efficiency of SIS II. Commissioner 
Avramopoulos also pointed out the need to reinforce cooperation between Europol and other EU security 
agencies and bodies.  
As regards “identification of travel routes of terrorists”, the Commissioner stressed the need to be “more 
proactive” in monitoring suspicious movement across borders and to gather information. He confirmed the 
urgent necessity of the EU PNR and the Commission’s current reformulation of a new legal instrument.25 
Details of the new draft EU PNR proposal saw the light on 28 January in The Guardian.26 The European 
Commission proposes amendments to the previous proposal dating back to 2011.27 It is not clear the extent to 
which this is an attempt to bring the proposal more in line with the strict criteria as defined by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Digital Rights Ireland judgment,28 where the Court invalidated 
the Data Retention Directive (see Section 2.1 below). Commissioner Avramopoulos also pointed out that the 
Commission has already adopted new measures to improve the effectiveness of SIS II for counterterrorism 
purposes, so that:  
SIS will now be able to reinforce the efforts of Member states to invalidate personal identification 
documents of persons who may join terrorist groups outside the European Union. What we are 
doing now is developing common risk indicators and criteria for entering relevant alerts in the 
Schengen Information System (SIS). 
This will be done through the adoption of a European Commission Implementing Decision that will replace 
the annex to a previous Commission Implementing Decision 2013/115/EU on the SIRENE Manual and other 
implementing measures for the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II).29 The new decision 
aims at providing instructions to relevant law enforcement authorities on accelerated reporting and invalidated 
documents used for travel purposes. The draft version states in point 6: 
It is indispensable to lay down a new accelerated procedure for information exchange on alerts on 
discreet and specific checks in order to address a possible increased threat posed by some persons, 
involved in terrorism or in serious crime, which require immediate action of the competent 
 
24 Speech of Commissioner Avramopoulos: Discussions on fighting terrorism at the informal JHA council in Riga, Riga, 
29 January 2015. 
25 www.statewatch.org/news/2015/jan/com-pnr-plans.htm and www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/28/european-
commission-blanket-collection-passenger-data. 
26 www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/28/european-commission-blanket-collection-passenger-data. 
27 EU PNR – the way forward, http://statewatch.org/news/2015/jan/eu-com-new-pnr-note.pdf. 
28 Case C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, 8 April 2014, Court of Justice of the European Union. 
29 For the version currently in force, see http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0115 
&from=EN. 
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authorities. It is necessary to indicate for end-users if a document used for travel purposes was 
invalidated by the issuing national authorities to ensure the seizure of such documents.30 
As regards firearms, Commissioner Avramopoulos announced the need to review existing legislation on 
firearms and the Commission’s intention to submit to the European Parliament and the Council a report on the 
situation and on whether new legislative or non-legislative proposals are needed.31 At the same meeting, 
Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and Gender Equality Vĕra Jourová32 underlined, among other initiatives, 
the need to accelerate the negotiation of the proposed ‘data protection police’ Directive (COM(2012)10) 
dealing with data protection in the fields of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.33 This proposal 
is part of a wider data protection reform legislative package that the Commission launched in early 2012 and 
that is also composed of the general data protection Regulation (COM(2012)11).34 
2. Securing consent? Responses to the Paris event and the erasing of 
controversies 
The previous section has revealed a long list of initiatives presenting multifaceted aspects. Some are rather 
technical, which makes it difficult for any logical understanding of their actual reach, scope and value added. 
However, a central point where all these counterterrorism proposals seem to converge relates to fostering 
exchange of intelligence-led information and use of large-scale databases allowing for systematic 
surveillance of EU citizen and resident movement in the Schengen territory.  
A majority of these proposals predated the Paris shootings. This is obvious when looking at the measures 
already discussed in meetings such as the 3,354th Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting Conclusions of 
4-5 December 2014.35 This meeting debated the issue of foreign fighters on the basis of the EU Counter-
Terrorism Coordinator Report on the Implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy.36  
The lack of novelty of the counterterrorism solutions that have been put forward is therefore evident. More 
important, however, some of these measures had until now proved highly controversial as regards their 
efficacy, legitimacy and lawfulness. This has been the situation in respect of the EU PNR and smart borders 
proposals (section 2.1), and the EU radicalisation strategy (section 2.2). 
2.1 EU PNR and smart borders  
A case in point is the EU Passenger Name Record (EU PNR). An EU PNR framework would allow for 
information being provided by every passenger, collected by air carriers and used for their ticketing, 
reservation and check-in systems. PNR needs to be distinguished from advanced passenger information (API), 
 
30 Available at www.statewatch.org/news/2015/feb/eu-com-amend-sch-code-checks.pdf. 
31 More specific ideas were outlined by DG Home Affairs on 27 January in a debate on “Counter-Terrorism, 
Radicalisation and Foreign Fighters”, which took place at LIBE Committee in the European Parliament following the 
events in Paris on 7 January and in the run-up to the informal JHA Council on 29-30 January in Riga and the European 
Council on 12 February. 
32 Speech of Commissioner Jourová: Discussions on fighting terrorism at the informal JHA council in Riga, Riga, 29 
January 2015. 
33 See European Commission, proposal for directive on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data, COM(2012) 10 final, 25.1.2012, 
Brussels.  
34 European Commission, proposal for a regulation on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, 25 
January 2012. 
35 Council of the EU, 16526/14, Press 630, Press Release 3,354th Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting, 4-5 
December Brussels. See also www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/145004.pdf. 
36 Council of the EU, Report on the Implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 28 November 2014, 15799/14, 
Brussels. See also the Discussion Paper http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15715-2014-REV-2/en/pdf. 
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which is currently under operation in the EU on the basis of Directive 2004/82.37 Whereas API concerns data 
from the machine-readable zone of the passport (including name, date of birth, passport number and 
nationality), PNR contains information registered by the airline companies when a traveller makes a 
reservation. The data that may be taken from PNR depends on the information the traveller submits to the 
ticket reservation system.38 
The Commission had first tabled a proposal to establish an EU PNR system back in November 2007.39 In 
November 2008, the European Parliament refused to vote on the proposal due to concerns with data protection 
and privacy. Similar concerns were raised by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the EU Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA), the Article 29 Working Party and other organisations. The initiative 
nonetheless made it into the 2009 Stockholm Programme – the Third Multi-Annual Programme for the Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice40 – and the Commission presented a new version of the initiative in 2011.41  
In April 2013, the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament rejected the 2011 Commission proposal to 
establish EU PNR.42 Concerns included that the European Commission had presented only anecdotal evidence 
for the usefulness of EU PNR data in the fight against terrorism and serious transnational crime, as well as 
doubts regarding the necessity and proportionality of the blanket retention of all passenger data. The LIBE 
Committee called for reinforcing the principle of purpose limitation, exclusion of data mining and profiling, 
and proper access and redress rights. Moreover, both the LIBE Committee and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS),43 held that adoption of the EU PNR proposal should not precede the agreement on the 
general framework of EU data protection rules mentioned above.  
A number of independent studies have provided further evidence of the lack of cost-effectiveness inherent to 
the EU PNR proposal for a directive. These have also proved that the Commission has so far not justified the 
added value of an EU PNR system for the prevention or prosecution of terrorist offences or serious crimes, nor 
demonstrated its compliance with the EU legally binding principles of proportionality and necessity.44 As the 
Article 29 Working Party has recently stated: 
The Article 29 Working Party reaffirms that the extent and indiscriminate nature of EU PNR data 
processing for the fight against terrorism and serious crime is likely to seriously undermine the 
right to the protection of private life and personal data of all travellers as set out in Articles 7 and 
8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union…such an interference with the 
fundamental rights would be permissible only if its necessity was to be demonstrated and the 
principle of proportionality respected (emphasis added).45 
 
37 Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 August 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, OJ L 261/24, 
6.8.2004. 
38 E. Brouwer (2011), “Ignoring Dissent and Legality: The EU’s Proposal to Share the Personal Information of all 
Passengers”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. 
39 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for 
law enforcement purposes, COM(2007) 654, Brussels, 6 November 2007. 
40 S. Carrera and E. Guild (2012), “Does the Stockholm Programme Matter? The Struggles over Ownership of AFSJ 
Multiannual Programming”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. 
41 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of Passenger 
Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime, 
COM(2011) 32, Brussels, 2 February 2011. 
42 Refer to www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130422IPR07523/html/Civil-Liberties-Committee-
rejects-EU-Passenger-Name-Record-proposal. 
43 See also EDPS, Opinion on the Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of 
Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious 
crime, adopted on 25 March 2011, and also Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2011, adopted on 5 
April 2011. 
44 Brouwer (2011). 
45 See www.cnil.fr/english/news-and-events/news/article/press-release-wp-29-statement-on-the-eu-pnr-system. 
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Similar concerns have been raised as regards EU proposals on smart borders, which was first launched by the 
Commission in its 2008 Communication “Preparing the Next Steps in Border Management in the European 
Union”.46 The proposals were subject to heated debates and concerns across EU institutions and academic, 
policy and civil society circles.47 It took the Commission five years to take concrete legislative steps forward. 
The Commission presented the smart borders package in February 2013. The package is composed of an Entry-
Exit System (EES) designed to register third-country nationals entering and leaving the EU territory,48 and a 
Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) aimed at speeding up border-crossing for vetted or “bona fide” 
travellers based on automated identity checks and border-crossing gates. The financial and technical feasibility 
of the European Commission’s February 2013 legislative proposals for EU smart borders has proven a matter 
of controversy and disagreement.49 
It is important to highlight that the primary focus of instruments such as the EU PNR or smart borders seems 
to be on detection and identification of travel, which has only limited links to the actual background of the 
Paris events. The ‘travel’ dimension of the attacks was minimal. It is understood that the attackers did not 
engage in undetected international travel. US and French intelligence services appear to have been aware that 
two of them had travelled to Yemen, purportedly to undergo training.50 The third attacker, Amedy Coulibaly, 
is understood never to have travelled to training camps in the Middle East,51 and was also known to and under 
surveillance of French intelligence and law enforcement.  
One therefore wonders the extent to which these policy initiatives would have actually contributed to 
effectively preventing the Paris attacks. This comes along with the fact that the individuals who committed the 
attacks in Paris were already known to security authorities. It appears that several member states already 
possessed information indicating they could pose a threat.52 Consequently, how ‘more information’ about 
people travelling would have actually helped remains unclear.53  
2.2 Radicalisation 
The above-mentioned JHA Council Conclusions of December 2014 adopted the Guidelines for the EU Strategy 
for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment of Terrorism, which were intended to implement the revised 
EU Strategy adopted by the Council in June 2014, which in turn supplemented the first strategy issued in 
 
46 European Commission (2008), Preparing the Next Steps in border management in the European Union, COM(2008)69 
final, 13 February 2008, Brussels. 
47 E. Guild, S. Carrera and F. Geyer (2008), “The Commission’s New Border Package: Does it take us one step closer to 
cyber-fortress Europe?”, CEPS Policy Brief, Brussels. 
48 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit 
data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union, COM(2013) 
95 final, Brussels; and European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Registered Traveller Programme, 
COM(2013) 97 final, Brussels. 
49 J. Jeandesboz, D. Bigo, B. Hayes and S. Simon (2013), “The Commission’s legislative proposals on smart borders: 
their feasibility and costs”, Brussels: European Parliament, PE 493.026. 
50 See www.liberation.fr/monde/2015/01/15/attentats-a-paris-la-justice-espagnole-enquete-sur-un-sejour-de-coulibaly-
en-espagne_1181351. 
51 Ibid. (see also http://mondediplo.com/2015/02/04radicalisation). 
52 “Chérif Kouachi, un djihadiste bien connu des services antiterroristes”, Le Journal du Dimanche, 8 January 2015 
(www.lejdd.fr/Societe/Faits-divers/Attentat-de-Charlie-Hebdo-Cherif-Kouachi-un-jihadiste-bien-connu-des-services-
antiterroristes-711082). 
53 In 2011, the EDPS adopted the opinion that the PNR proposal did not meet the necessity principle: the proposed 
Passenger Name Record (PNR) system does not “demonstrate the necessity and the proportionality of a system involving 
a large-scale collection of PNR data for the purpose of a systematic assessment of all passengers” (see 
https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/2011-04-01-edps-pnr-proposal-does-not-meet-necessity-principle). 
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2005.54 As reported by the EU CTC,55 there are a number of initiatives at member state and EU levels “on 
early detection of the radicalisation process which potential foreign fighters go through”. In addition, RAN has 
collected data on civil society initiatives and ‘good practices’ for engagement with foreign fighters or their 
environments.  
The European Commission adopted a Communication on “Preventing radicalisation to terrorism and violent 
extremism: strengthening the EU’s response” on 15 January 2014, one of whose main goals is the 
establishment this year of a European knowledge hub on violent extremism, concentrating expertise in 
preventing and countering radicalisation to terrorism and violent extremism. A number of member states have 
developed specific projects in this regard, some of which also relates to the Internet.56  
It is worth noting that the counter-radicalisation strategies outlined in these documents have been the target of 
high-level criticism and concern the process on which counter-radicalisation policies are premised, i.e. that of 
a progressive and predictable passage to violence has been broadly rejected by the scientific community, 
including by a report explicitly commissioned by DG Home Affairs in 2008.57  
Similarly, the EU counter-radicalisation strategy of 2005 adopted under the UK’s presidency, and revised in 
2014, is largely based on the UK’s early PREVENT strand of the CONTEST strategy.58 This ‘softer approach’ 
(not based on counter-terrorism legislation) to preventing radicalisation has drawn criticism from across the 
political spectrum as being inefficient, inconclusive and possibly damaging to community relations.59 It has 
recently been criticised by important figures such as MI5’s former head, Baroness Manningham Buller, who 
warned of the danger of the population turning to “vigilantism” due to the atmosphere of fear induced by 
terrorism.60 This has been confirmed by a recent study that concluded, “[W]hile these programmes do not 
directly contribute to the escalation of violence per se, they have in several instances been found to generate a 
feeling of suspicion that is unhelpful to the relations between the state and Muslim communities in Europe”.61 
 
54 Council of the EU, Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, Brussels, 19 May 
2014, and Council of the EU, The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, 
Brussels, 24 November 2005. 
55 Council of the EU, Report on the Implementation of the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 28 November 2014, 15799/14, 
Brussels. See also the Discussion Paper (http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15715-2014-REV-2/en/pdf). 
56 Ibid. According to the Report, “The Check the Web (CTW) portal, which was set up as a consequence of the work 
initiated by Germany in the context of its Internet work stream, is still being run by Europol. In 2014, the CTW team 
played a key role in a number of investigations as it served as an expert witness in court cases. Clean IT, a Dutch-led 
project that started in 2011 and ended in early 2013. The project’s objective was to tackle the use of the Internet for 
terrorist purposes through public-private partnerships. The final report was presented in January 2013.”  
57 European Commission’s Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation (2008), Radicalisation Processes Leading to Acts of 
Terrorism.  
58 PREVENT consisted initially of initiatives ranging from targeted local partnerships between community representatives 
and law enforcement to broader community cohesion programmes (Preventing Extremism Together) and mentoring 
schemes for potential radicals (CHANNEL). The PREVENT programme came under considerable criticism from both 
state institutions – in particular with a report of the House of Commons Select Committee Report on Preventing Violent 
Extremism (House of Commons 2010) – and non-governmental institutions, which included community representatives 
and civil liberties organisations (see www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf). 
59 House of Commons, House of Lords Joint Committee on National Security Strategy (2012), First Review of the 
National Security Strategy 2010. London: Great Britain Parliament House of Commons. 
60 “Tony Blair’s anti-jihadist programme has failed, says ex-MI5 chief”, The Telegraph, 14 January 2015 
(www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/11344281/MI5-chief-Blairs-anti-jihadist-programme-has-
failed.html). 
61 D. Bigo, L. Bonelli, E. Guittet and F. Ragazzi (2014), “Preventing and Countering Youth Radicalisation in the EU”, 
European Parliament Study, Brussels. This study also includes a review of the scientific literature on this subject. 
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3. The challenges: Freedom of circulation and democratic rule of law at stake 
EU counterterrorism policy responses to the Paris events and the emergency-led policy-making logic pose two 
fundamental challenges: first, to free movement, Schengen and Union citizenship (Section 3.1); second, to the 
democratic rule of law and fundamental rights (Section 3.2). 
3.1 Free movement, Schengen and EU citizenship 
A common thread characterising the set of EU policy responses outlined in Section 1 is their focus on mobility 
surveillance via large-scale databases that facilitate the exchange of information on travelling EU citizens and 
residents among police and intelligence authorities. The target of initiatives such as EU PNR is all travellers, 
including EU citizens, crossing borders, including internal borders in the Schengen territory and when leaving 
the common Schengen territory. This discussion has even led to the question of whether Schengen is working 
effectively. A key challenge that emerges when looking at the entire package of ‘mobility-focused’ policy 
initiatives advanced by the EU responses outlined in Section 1 is that a central contradiction arises with the 
Schengen and free movement principle.  
Large-scale surveillance and systematic monitoring by police and intelligence authorities of EU citizens’ 
movements on the basis of ‘risk categories’ is problematic on various fronts. It does not only undermine 
freedom of circulation. The proposed measures, if implemented, may be in violation of the right to non-
discrimination, because the use of profiling will inevitably lead to the unfair targeting of European citizens 
with a second (‘foreign’) nationality or foreign background.  
Databases such as EU PNR or smart borders will represent a move towards a person-centric approach in 
mobility control and surveillance, where an individual may be or become a security risk on the basis of 
profiles not necessarily related to nationality or migration status, but rather to other behavioural, physical or 
physiological characteristics. This move towards profiling and data-mining stands in a difficult relationship 
with the principle of non-discrimination, which is at the basis of the EU legal system and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.62 
The new amendments that the Commission is currently introducing in SIS II through an ‘implementing 
decision’ are equally of concern. Not only does the decision-making process prevent any democratic debate 
and input by the European Parliament. It also raises questions concerning the need and actual effectiveness of 
widening the scope of systematising the crossing of EU external borders by EU citizens. To what extent will 
the development of common risk indicators and criteria for entering relevant alerts in SIS comply with 
the above-mentioned principles of non-discrimination and proportionality?  
In accordance with the proportionality clause, as included in Article 21 of both the SIS II Regulation 
1987/200663 and the SIS II Decision 2007/533,64 each member state must, before entering an alert into SIS II, 
determine “whether the case is adequate, relevant and important enough to warrant entry of the alert”. The 
ways in which this requirement will be met in the practical implementation of the new Commission amendment 
remains contested. 
EU citizenship also seems to be increasingly at stake. Initiatives such as deprivation of nationality on the basis 
of suspicion that EU citizens may be involved in acts of political violence stand in a difficult relationship with 
international and European legal principles and standards applicable to EU member states in cases of 
involuntary loss of nationality and EU citizenship.65 These individuals are wrongly labelled as ‘foreign 
fighters’, as they are in fact not foreigners but rather EU nationals and therefore qualify for Union citizenship. 
 
62 S. Carrera and N. Hernanz (2015), “Re-Imagining Mobility and Identity Controls: The Next Generation of the EU 
Migration Management Toolkit”, Journal of Borderlands Studies, forthcoming. 
63 Regulation 1987/2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System 
(SIS II), 20 December 2006. 
64 Decision 2007/533 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen Information System 
(SIS II), 12 June 2007.  
65 S. Carrera and R. de Groot (2014), “European Citizenship at the Crossroads: Enhancing European Cooperation on 
Acquisition and Loss of Nationality”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. 
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Amongst the most relevant principles in this context are those of the protection of Union citizenship as well as 
procedural guarantees and international law principles protecting individuals against statelessness.  
3.2 EU democratic rule of law 
EU responses calling for an urgent adoption of instruments such as EU PNR could also be read as a challenge 
to the roles of and contributions by the European Parliament and the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
Both institutions, however, play a key function in ensuring the respect of democratic rule of law with 
fundamental rights principle and appropriate checks and balances in the adoption and implementation of 
legislative counterterrorism acts falling within the remit of the EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
Since December 2014 the Commission and the CJEU have full enforcement powers over EU member states 
of legislative measures adopted in the areas of police and criminal justice cooperation, including those related 
to counterterrorism.66 The European Parliament became co-legislator in these domains at the end of 2009 with 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.67 These Treaty-based innovations sought to address the democratic 
and judicial deficits, as well as the lack of transparency that used to characterise Justice and Home Affairs 
cooperation at EU level.  
Both the European Parliament and the CJEU have expressed deep concerns about the necessity and 
proportionality of large-scale (blanket) surveillance and data retention in the scope of EU 
counterterrorism policies. EU counterterrorism responses can be read as resistance to the EU democratic rule 
of law introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to EU-decision making in questions related to security cooperation 
including counterterrorism policies. 
The LIBE Committee of the European Parliament has been particularly critical as regards large-scale 
surveillance68 and specific tools such as the EU PNR Proposal for Directive,69 which as stated above was 
voted down in April 2013.70 Main concerns included that the Commission had only presented anecdotal 
evidence as regards the added value of a proactive use of PNR data in the fight against terrorism and the lack 
of debate in respect of the necessity and proportionality of the blanket retention of all passenger data. Also, the 
LIBE Committee members were concerned that the Commission had not explored less intrusive alternatives 
to the EU PNR. A plenary majority decided to refer the proposal back to the LIBE Committee for further 
examination. The LIBE Committee of the new European Parliament was supposed to continue work on the 
file based on a new draft report by its rapporteur Timothy Kirkhope.  
Data retention has been illustrative of another counterterrorism instrument encountering both a great 
lack of consensus and controversy at various EU levels. After heated debates at domestic and EU instances 
 
66 Protocol 36 to the EU Treaties limited some of the most far-reaching innovations introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon 
over EU cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA) for a period of five years (1 December 2009 to 1 December 2014). 
Such limits included restrictions on the enforcement powers of the European Commission and of the judicial scrutiny of 
the Court of Justice of the European Union over legislative measures adopted in these fields before the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty under the old EU Third Pillar (Title VI of the former version of the Treaty on the European Union). 
For a study on the main legal and political challenges and implications of the end of this Transitional Protocol refer to V. 
Mitsilegas, S. Carrera and K. Eisele (2014), “The End of the Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures: 
Who Monitors Trust in the European Criminal Justice Area?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. 
67 S. Carrera, N. Hernanz and J. Parkin (2013), “The ‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament: Assessing progress, 
shortcomings and challenges for democratic accountability in the area of freedom, security and justice”, CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. 
68 See for instance the European Parliament (2014), Report on the US NSA surveillance programme, surveillance bodies 
in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’ fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice 
and Home Affairs, 2013/2188/INI, 21 February. 
69 Proposal for a Directive on the use of Passenger Name Record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and 
prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime COM(2011) 32 final, Brussels, 2.2.2011. 
70 See www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130422IPR07523/html/Civil-Liberties-Committee-
rejects-EU-Passenger-Name-Record-proposal. 
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during its national implementation phase, the Data Retention Directive71 was finally invalidated by the CJEU 
in its Digital Rights Ireland (DRI) judgment in 2014.72 The Court stated that the Directive entailed a wide-
ranging and particularly serious interference with the right to respect for privacy and data protection in the 
legal order of the EU, without such an interference being circumscribed by provisions to ensure that it is 
actually limited to what is strictly necessary. In view of the Court, therefore, the Directive was disproportionate 
and undermined the data protection requirements laid down in Article 8 of the EU Charter, and hence failed to 
pass the EU legality test. The CJEU also laid down a set of legal standards for any new piece of EU legislative 
covering data retention to be lawful.73  
It is questionable whether the recent plan of the Commission to amend the EU PNR system in 
accordance with the CJEU’s DRI criteria are sufficient. For example, in this plan, the Commission proposes 
to reduce the retention period of ‘full PNR data’ to seven days (instead of 30 days in the 2011 proposal) before 
the data are depersonalised. However, depersonalised data are not the same as anonymous data: it will always 
remain possible for appointed law enforcement authorities to individualise the data stored in the EU PNR 
system. The general continued data retention period of (depersonalised) data of all air passengers in the EU is 
still to be considered as disproportionally long. Furthermore, the Commission proposes an optional role of a 
judicial authority in the member states to oversee the transfer of personal data to other member states and third 
states, indicating that this is in line with the Court’s request for sufficient guarantees.  
That notwithstanding, the CJEU conclusions make clear that much stricter (and mandatory) prior control 
of both data transfers and purpose of the use of these data is necessary.74 Finally, the Commission does 
not address one of the most important conclusions of the CJEU, namely that not only the proposed measure of 
large-scale data retention must be appropriate to attain the objective pursued, but also derogations and 
limitations to the right to data protection must apply only in so far as is strictly necessary.75 This also remains 
an open challenge affecting the EU PNR initiative.  
Furthermore, when addressing the links between the EU ‘internal’ security policies with other international 
instances of cooperation, careful regard should be paid to the position held by the Luxembourg Court 
concerning the relationship between international obligations and the respect of fundamental human rights in 
EU antiterrorism policies. In the Kadi cases,76 the CJEU held EU legislation implementing UN instruments on 
antiterrorism incompatible with fundamental rights.77 
These judicial and legal challenges have emerged in an era of Edward Snowden’s revelations of large-scale 
surveillance systems in the US and the EU and their negative repercussions for the rights and liberties of 
 
71 Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
electronic communications sector. 
72 Case C-293/12 & C-594/12, op. cit. For an analysis see E. Guild and S. Carrera (2014), “The Political and Judicial Life 
of Metadata: Digital Rights Ireland and the Trail of the Data Retention Directive”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security 
in Europe, CEPS, Brussels. 
73 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
74 C-293/12 & C-594/12, op. cit., paragraph 62: “Above all, the access by the competent national authorities to the data 
retained is not made dependent on a prior review carried out by a court or by an independent administrative body whose 
decision seeks to limit access to the data and their use to what is strictly necessary for the purpose of attaining the objective 
pursued and which intervenes following a reasoned request of those authorities submitted within the framework of 
procedures of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions. Nor does it lay down a specific obligation on Member States 
designed to establish such limits.”  
75 Ibid., paragraphs 49-52. 
76 Case T-306/01 Yusuf and Al Barakaat Foundation v. Council and Case T-315/01 Kadi v. Council and Commission; 
Case T-85/09, Kadi v. European Commission, 30 September 2010; and Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-
595/10 of 18 July 2013, Court of Justice of the European Union. 
77 D. Bigo et al. (2015), “National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and before the Courts: Exploring the 
Challenges”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. 
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individuals around the globe.78 These developments have also shed light on the lack of proper and effective 
judicial scrutiny of the practices of intelligence communities across certain EU member states when it 
comes to issues of electronic surveillance of communications and the uses of the concepts of national security 
and state secrets as ways to evade judicial accountability of intelligence communities’ practices. A recent study 
commissioned by the European Parliament calls for tighter judicial guarantees in order to mitigate the 
weaknesses these concepts impose on the rights of the defence and freedom of information.79 
4. Conclusions and Recommendations  
This Policy Brief has argued that EU policy initiatives put forward in response to the Paris attacks call for 
careful and cautious reflection and debate. This is based on the following two reasons. First, they are not 
solutions devised to respond directly to the Paris phenomena. They predate the events and have previously 
encountered controversy and lack of consensus due to their repercussions for rule of law and fundamental 
rights. Second, they are overly focused on enhancing surveillance and systematic monitoring of all citizens 
moving inside and outside Europe.  
By doing so, they are ‘ultra-solutions’ rather than actual solutions.80 As Watzlawick wrote ironically in 1988, 
an ‘ultra-solution’ is “a solution which is more destructive than the problem itself because it reinforces the 
roots of the problem and adds its own specific problems”.81 It is a process by which people learn “how to 
succeed to fail”. They engage happily in it, repetitively, often because it remains unseen to the eyes of the 
public, and sometimes to their own eyes. They end up believing seriously that their actions have no 
consequences, and that all the problems come only from the other’s actions. 
Considered collectively, the set of initiatives put forward by EU member state representatives, European 
institutions and security professionals lead to fundamental contradictions. This paper has argued that EU 
counterterrorism responses raise two important challenges to the Union: first, to freedom of movement, 
Schengen and European citizenship; and second, to democratic rule of law. Proposals such as the EU PNR or 
the extensions of systematic border controls to citizens crossing borders in Europe stand in contravention of 
Schengen and the free movement paradigm.  
For all these reasons, this paper concludes that EU policy-makers and security professionals should implement 
a cautious approach and a rational and non-emergency-induced way of policy-making on counterterrorism 
responses. Otherwise, the EU contribution to the Paris events will lead to more insecurity and legal uncertainty 
rather than security. In light of the experience and lessons learned from the rapid adoption of similarly 
contested measures in the past following terrorist events, it will also ultimately face rule of law and judicial 
accountability by relevant Courts, which will cause unrest and a disproportionate amount of effort to ‘clean 
up’ the situation at a later stage.  
Instead, the EU could adopt a new European Agenda on Security and Liberty, which would be based on an 
alternative EU security (criminal justice-led) cooperation model firmly based on current EU legal principles 
and rule of law standards. The model should be built on the premise that less is more in what concerns the use 
and exchange of data by police and intelligence communities. It should call for less data retention and 
processing, and better and more accurate use of data that meets the quality standards of evidence in criminal 
judicial proceedings. 
 
78 D. Bigo et al. (2013), “Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by EU Member States and its Compatibility with EU Law”, 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels. For a critique on the role of digital surveillance and big data 
analytics as the solution to counterterrorism, and its lack of effectiveness, refer to Z. Bauman, D. Bigo, P. Esteves, E. 
Guild, V. Jabri, D. Lyon and R. B. J. Walker (2014), “After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance”, 
International Political Sociology, Volume 8, Issue 2, pp. 121-144, June. 
79 Bigo et al. (2015). 
80 D. Bigo and S. Carrera (2004), “From New York to Madrid: Technology as the Ultra-Solution to the Permanent State 
of Fear and Emergency in the EU”, CEPS Commentary, Brussels.  
81 P. Watzlawick (1988), Comment réussir à échouer : Trouver l’ultrasolution, Paris: Seuil. 
16  BIGO, BROUWER, CARRERA, GUILD, GUITTET, JEANDESBOZ, RAGAZZI & SCHERRER 
On the basis of the above, the following policy recommendations are put forward: 
1. A first step of a new EU security cooperation model should be for the EU to carry out an in-depth 
evaluation/study of the gaps in and deficits of current EU counterterrorism legislation, information 
systems and actors/agencies, as well as the rule of law and implementation challenges affecting their 
practical application.  
2. The EU should develop and adopt a new evaluation mechanism similar to the one devised for the 
Schengen Evaluation Mechanism82 but covering measures falling under the scope of police and 
criminal justice cooperation.83 This would equip the current European Commission with the 
information necessary to enforce the implementation by EU member state authorities of former EU-
Third Pillar legal instruments, which after the end of the transitional period are subject to full 
enforcement powers of the Commission and the Luxembourg Court of Justice. 
3. The implications of the CJEU’s Digital Rights Ireland judgment for initiatives such as EU PNR or the 
smart borders proposals should be studied carefully before adopting any new legislative measure that 
may face similar legal challenges before European Courts. The Commission should propose a measure 
on enhanced data preservation that would be in compliance with the ruling.84 
4. The EU PNR proposal should not be adopted in its current form. Its value and necessity should be 
critically reconsidered. The CJEU has made it clear that privacy protection needs to be intrinsic to any 
measure that seeks to create exceptions and interferences with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
The EU PNR should be designed to comply with the Digital Rights Ireland judgment. In case it 
becomes clear that the EU PNR system is not only inappropriate but also not strictly necessary for the 
purpose of fighting terrorism and serious crime, it should be abandoned. Furthermore, before adopting 
the EU PNR proposal, agreement should be reached on the general data protection framework in the 
EU, including the rules applying to law enforcement, in order to prevent diverging levels of data 
protection in the EU. 
5. One aspect of the Paris attacks that is particularly worrying is the availability of illicit arms like those 
of the attackers. Central to reducing the supply of illegal firearms is better controls. Substantial 
progress has been made across the EU in controlling and monitoring the availability and sale of 
components for explosive devises. Clearly, more efforts need to be put into controlling and monitoring 
access to firearms. An assessment of the gaps and challenges affecting the use of SIS II for these 
purposes should be carried out, in close cooperation with the European Parliament. 
6. EU member states policies and initiatives on deprivation of citizenship and travel documents should 
be examined from the perspective of their compatibility with EU law and standards, as well as the 
status of citizenship of the Union. Particular attention should be paid to supranational supervision of 
member states’ delivery of effective remedies and other procedural guarantees to those EU citizens 
subject to these kinds of practices. The compatibility of these policies and practices with the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights should also be carefully examined. 
7. Any transnational cooperation on national security must go hand-in-hand with independent judicial 
accountability and democratic scrutiny of intelligence communities and law enforcement practices. 
 
82 Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 of 7 October 2013 establishing an evaluation and monitoring mechanism to 
verify the application of the Schengen acquis and repealing the Decision of the Executive Committee of 16 September 
1998 setting up a Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen. 
83 As previously proposed in V. Mitsilegas, S. Carrera and K. Eisele (2014), “The End of the Transitional Period for Police 
and Criminal Justice Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who monitors trust in the European Criminal Justice 
area?”, CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, Brussels.  
84 As explained in Guild and Carrera (2014), op. cit., p. 2, “Data preservation is a specific targeted law enforcement 
measure managed by judicial authorities across the EU member states and often used as a less intrusive alternative to data 
retention. In the case of preservation, a judge must be convinced that it is necessary in a specific case of law enforcement 
to quick-freeze someone’s data. Thus the criminal justice systems control the issuing of data preservation orders, and 
these institutions are familiar with the necessity of acting within the confines of due process and fair trial”. 
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The EU should adopt an inter-institutional EU Code for the Transnational Management and 
Accountability of Information in the EU addressed to the intelligence communities in the member 
states. Such a code could aim at ensuring that the practices of intelligence services are in accordance 
with fundamental rights and rule of law principles without undermining their work.85 
8. An EU Observatory should be set up composed of a network of independent and interdisciplinary 
scholars who address questions related to extremism, radicalisation, national security, intelligence 
security cooperation, judicial oversight and the legality of anti-terrorism policies.86 
  
 
85 This proposal has been developed in Bigo (2015). 
86 Bigo et al. (2014). 
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